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Oneof the principal results in the economic
theory of liability is that, assuming litigation is
costless, the rule of strict liability with
compensatory damages leads the injurer to choose the
socially appropriate level of care. This paper
reexamines this result when litigation is costly. It
is shown that strict liability with compensatory
damages generally leads to a socially inappropriate
level of care and to excessive litigation costs.
Social welfare can be increased by adjusting
compensatory damages upward or downward, with the
desired direction depending on the effect of changes in
the level of liability on the injurer's decision to
take care and on the victim's decision to bring suit.
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The central concern of the economic theory of liability is
how to induce an injurer to take the socially appropriate level
of care——the level that minimizes the sum of the cost of taking
care and the losses of victims..! An important result in this
theory is that, assuming litigation is costless, the rule of
strict liability with compensatory damages (in which the injurer
pays the victims' losses) leads the injurer to choose the
appropriate level of care. This follows because, under strict
liability with compensatory damages, the injurer's problem--of
minimizing his cost of care plus his cost of liability—-is
identical to society's problem.
The analysis of strict liability with compensatory damages
is affected in two ways when litigation costs are taken into
account. First, it is no longer true (as was implicitly assumed
in the preceding argument) that whenever a victim suffers harm he
will sue the injurer; only victims whose losses exceed their cost
of litigation will sue. This difference could lead the injurer
to take less care (because he will not have to pay for all of the
losses he causes) or more care (because, for example, by reducing
the harm suffered by victims, he can reduce the number who sue).
Second, the social problem now becomes one of minimizing the sum
of the cost of care, the losses of victims, and the cost of
litigation, With these changes, it may no longer be optimal to
set the level of liability equal to the victim's loss.
The principal contribution of this paper is to analyze the
socially optimal adjustment to compensatory damages when
1litigation is costiy.L' Among other things, it will be shown
that the rule of strict liability with compensatory damages
generally will result in the injurer choosing an inappropriate
level of care, and in the parties incurring excessive litigation
costs. Thus, it is generally not socially optimal to use
compensatory damages. Whether compensatory damages should be
adjusted upward or downward will be seen to depend on the effect
of changes in the level of liability on the injurer's incentive
to take care and on the victims' incentives to sue.
The possibility that the optimal adjustment to compensatory
damages is positive can be illustrated by a simple example
involving one injurer and one victim. Suppose there are only two
levels of care that can be chosen by the injurer, "low care" and
"high care." If the injurer takes low care, the victim's loss
is $700, while if the injurer takes high care, the victim's
loss is $500. The injurer's cost of taking high care is $100
more than his cost of taking low care, and the victim's cost of
litigation is $1,000. (For simplicity, it is assumed that the
injurer's cost of litigation is zero.) Thus, in the ideal outcome,
the injurer would take high care; also, no litigation costs would
be incurred.
First consider whether this outcome can be achieved under
strict liability with compensatory damages. Regardless of
whether the injurer takes low care or high care, the victim will
not sue since his loss is less than his cost of litigation.
Consequently, the injurer will take low care, and the ideal
outcome will not be attained. Now consider strict liability with
2liability equal to compensatory damages plus $301. If the
injurer takes low care, the victim will sue because his loss plus
the adjustment exceeds his cost of litigation ($700+$301>
$1,000).But if the injurer takes high care, the victim will not
sue (since $500 +$301<$1,000).Therefore, the injurer will
choose to take high care because the extra cost of taking care
($100) is less than his liability if he takes low care ($700 +
$301).Since there will then not be any litigation, the ideal
outcome will be achieved.
The possibility that the optimal adjustment to compensatory
damages is negative can be shown by slightly modifying the
example. Assume now that the injurer's extra cost of taking high
care is $600, and that the victim's cost of litigation is $300.
Then the ideal outcome is for the injurer to take low care and,
as before, for there to be no litigation costs. Under strict
liability with compensatory damages, the victim will sue
regardless of whether the injurer takes low care or high care.
Consequently, the injurer will choose to take low care. However,
if compensatory damages are adjusted downward by $401, the victim
will not sue when the injurer takes low care (since $700 -$401<
$300).Thus, the ideal outcome will be attained.
The results in these examples reflect some more general
principles, the statement of which will servetosummarize the
paper.V With respect to the injurer's choice of care, adjusting
damages upward when the injurer's care would otherwise be too low
with compensatory damages, or downward when care would be too
high, will increase social welfare. And with respect to the
3costs of litigation, adjusting compensatory damages downward to
reduce the victims' incentives to sue——thereby reducing
litigation costs--will increase social welfare. The optimal
adjustment to compensatory damages takes both of these
considerations into account and may be positive or negative.
The main points of the paper are developed in section 2
using a model in which there is a single injurer and a group of
identical victims, and in section 3 using a model with two groups
of victims.(An appendix shows that the results of sections 2
and 3 hold more generally.) Section 4 takes the possibility of
settlement into account. In section 5 the model is extended
further to allow for the use of a negligence rule and for damage
adjustments that vary with victims' losses. Section 6 contains
some concluding remarks.J
42.A Model with Identical Victims
This section analyzes the rule of strict liability in a
model in which there is a single risk-neutral injurer and a fixed
number of identical risk—neutral victims. The injurer chooses a
level of care that determines the losses suffered by the
victims./ The victims sue if the damage award exceeds their
cost of litigation (assuming they bear their own litigation
costs). The social problem is to choose the level of the damage
award so as to minimize the sum of the injurer's cost of taking
care, the victims' losses, and the injurer's and the victims'
litigation costs. The optimal award will be divided into two
components: compensatory damages and an adjustment to
compensatory damages.
Let
c =injurer'slevel of care.
Units of care are defined so that one unit of care costs one
dollar. Let
10—kc =eachvictim's loss, given injurer's care,
where 1 >0and k >0are constants.-/ Obviously, 10—kc ￿ 0.
Note that k measures the "productivity" (or, more precisely, the
marginal benefit) of the injurer's care; the higher is k, the
more productive is care. Let
s =eachvictim's cost of litigation (S< lo),2/
r =injurer'scost of litigation per suit.
The number of victims is normalized to be unity; accordingly,
reference often will be made to a single victim. Finally, let
d =adjustmentto compensatory damages.
5To help interpret later results, it will be useful to derive
the first—best level of care. This level of care minimizes the
sum of the cost of care and the victims' losses, c +(l0-kc).J
Thus,the first-best level of care is:
Ila/k,if k >1,
(2.1) c* =
0, if k <1.
If k >1,the marginal benefit of care, k, is greater than the
marginal cost of care, 1. Therefore, it is socially desirable
for the injurer to take enough care to eliminate the victims'
losses. If k <1,it is not socially desirable for the injurer to
take any care.V
The first-best outcome consists of achieving the first—best
level of care without incurring litigation costs. Normally, the
first—best outcome will not be attainable for two reasons.
First, the victims may sue the injurer in order to receive
compensation; and second, the injurer may choose his level of
care knowing that he will not have to pay for all of the losses
he causes and that his choice may affect the victims' decisions
to sue.
Now consider the victims' and the injurer's behavior. A
victim will sue if the award of compensatory damages plus the
adjustment to compensatory damages exceeds his cost of
litigation:.]&/
(10—kc) +d>s.
Equivalently, the victim will sue if C< , where
(2.2) =(10+d—s)/k.
6The injurer chooses care to minimize the sum of his cost of
care, cost of liability, and cost of litigation..11! This sum is:
c +(10-kc+d)+r,if C (suits occur),
(2.3) A c, if c C(nosuits occur).
Because the marginal benefit of care is constant between zero
care and care equal to s——the lowest level of care that
forestalls suits——the injurer will choose one of these levels of
care. If care is productive, k >1,the injurer chooses care
equal tobecause the extra cost of care (relative to zero care)
is less than the reduction in liability costs; in addition, the
injurer avoids his litigation costs. If care is unproductive, k
<1,the extra cost of care is greater than the reduction in
liability costs; thus, the injurer will take zero care unless his
savings in litigation costs from taking care equal toare
sufficiently great. 121
Before deriving the socially optimal adjustment to
compensatory damages, it will be useful to consider the outcome
when there is no adjustment, i.e., when d =0.Suppose first
that k >1.The injurer's choice of care will be & =(l0-s)/k
(see (2.2)). This level of care forestalls suits, and thereby
eliminates litigation costs, but it is less than the first—best
level of care, 10/k (see (2.1)). Now suppose that k <1.If the
injurer's cost of litigation is sufficiently high, he will again
take care equal to although this level of care will forestall
suits and eliminate litigation costs, it exceeds the first—best
7level of care (zero care). If the injurer's cost of litigation
is sufficiently low, he will choose to take no care, which is the
first—best level of care. However, suits will occur (since c <
8).Thus, regardless of the productivity of care, compensatory
damages do not achieve the first—best outcome; either an
inappropriate level of care is taken or litigation costs are
incurred.
The socially optimal adjustment to compensatory damages, d*,
depends on the productivity of care. If k >1,the injurer's
care is 8 =(10+d-s)/kand, given this level of care, no suits
occur. The first-best level of care is 10/k. Therefore, the
first-best level of care can be obtained by:
d* =s>0.
This adjustment to compensatory damages makes suing more
attractive to victims and thereby requires the injurer to take
greater care to forestall suits. Thus, if k >1,the first—best
outcome can be achieved.
If k <1,the first-best level of care is zero care. It is
possible to obtain this level of care without incurring
litigation costs by adjusting compensatory damages downward
sufficiently to discourage victims from suing (even when the
injurer takes no care). From (2.2), it follows that:
d*=s_l0< 0,
again resulting in the first-best outcome..l-J
83.A Model with Two Types of Victims
In the model of the previous section the optimal adjustment
to compensatory damages always achieved the first-best outcome.
With the extension of the model in this section, the optimal
adjustment might not be able to accomplish this.
Now assume that there are two types of victims, who suffer
different losses..2-4J The level of care chosen by the injurer
determines the losses suffered by each type. It is also assumed
that the cost of litigation, as well as the adjustment to
compensatory damages, is the same for both types of victims.iJ
Except for the following changes, the notation will be
identical to that used in the previous section. Let
l1—kc =lossof victims of type 1,
12—kc =lossof victims of type 2,
t =fractionof victims who are of type 1.
It will be assumed that 12 >11>s;hereafter, the first type
of victim will be referred to as a "low—loser" and the second
type as a "high-loser."
The first—best level of care minimizes
c +t(l1-kc)+(l-t)(l2—kc).
Therefore, the first—best level of care is:
12/k, if k >
(3.1) c* =<11/k,if 1 <k<1/(1—t),
0, if k <1.
This expression can be explained as follows. The marginal
benefit of care depends on the level of care. The first unit
9of care benefits both low—losers and high—losers and therefore
has a marginal benefit of k. However, once care is high enough
to eliminate the losses of the low-losers, but not high enough
to eliminate the losses of the high-losers, the marginal
benefit of care falls to (J.-t)k. And when care is high enough
to eliminate the losses of both groups, the marginal benefit of
care is zero. The marginal cost of care is always 1.
Therefore, if k >l/(l-t),the marginal benefit of care exceeds
the marginal cost of care up to the level of care that
eliminates the losses of the high—losers, 12/k. If 1 <k<
1/(1-t),the marginal benefit of care exceeds the marginal cost
of care only up to the level of care that eliminates the losses
of the low—losers, 11/k. And if k <1,the marginal benefit of
care is less than the marginal cost of care at all levels of
care.
Low—losers will sue if
(l1—kc) +d>s,
or, equivalently, if c <, where
(3.2) =(11+d—s)/k.
Similarly, high—losers will sue if c <
where
(3.3) =(12+d—s)/k.
Before proceeding, it will be useful to refer to Figure 1.
This figure shows, for each type of victim, the range of care
over which harm occurs and the range over which suit
10FIGURE
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Thisfigure is based on the assumption that —1i <d <s.
11occurs. Note that for some levels of care, low—losers will be
harmed but will not sue, while for other levels of care, high—
losers will be harmed but will not sue.
The injurer's choice of care and the optimal adjustment to
compensatory damages will now be analyzed within each of the
three relevant ranges of the productivity of care, k (see (3.1)).
Recall that a different value of the first-best level of care is
associated with each range.
3.1 Care Very Productive (k >l/(l—t))
In this case, the first—best level of care is 12/k.
Neither low-losers nor high—losers suffer harm at this level
of care.
Given the high productivity of care, the injurer will
keep increasing care if either group is suing. Since the
lowest level of care that forestalls suits by both groups is
=(12+d—s)/k,the injurer will take this amount of care.
If compensatory damages (d =0)are used, the level of care
chosen by the injurer, (l2-s)/k, will be too low. The high-
losers will be harmed and the low—losers may be harmed, although
neither group will sue. However, if the adjustment to
compensatory damages is set equal to each victim's cost of
litigation, d =s,then care will increase to 12/k, the first-
best level of care. Since, at this level of care, no one sues
(because no one suffers harm), the first—best outcome is
achieved.
3.2 Care Moderately Productive (1 <k<l/(l—t))
In this case, the first-best level of care is 11/k. At
12this level of care, the high-losers suffer harm, but the low-
losers do not.
The injurer will invest in care at least up to the level of
C1; below that level, the marginal benefit of care to the injurer
exceeds the marginal cost of care since both groups will be
suing. Between l and c2, additional care is not productive at
the margin since only the high-losers are suing. However, by
taking care equal to 2' the injurer can forestall suits by the
high—losers and thereby totally eliminate his litigation costs.
Taking care above 2 is never worthwhile to the injurer since no
one is suing. Thus, the injurer's choice of care will be either
A Aorc2.





At 2' the corresponding sum is:
(3.5) =(l2+d—s)/k.
Thus, the injurer will choose 2 over c1 i
(3.6) (l2—11)/k <(l—t)(12—l1+s)+(l—t)r.
In other words, the injurer will choose ê2whenthe extra cost
of care, (l2—l1)/k, is less than his savings in liability and
litigation costs, (l—t) (12—11+s) +(l—t)r...-/
The optimal adjustment to compensatory damages depends on
13whether the injurer's choice of care is or 2• Suppose first
that the injurer chooses .Ifcompensatory damages are used,
the injurer's care, (11—s)/k, would be less than the first—best
level, 11/k, and litigation costs would be incurred because of
suits by the high—losers. By setting the adjustment to
compensatory damages equal to the victim's cost of litigation,
d =s,the injurer can be induced to take the first-best level of
care (see (3.2)). However, the first-best outcome cannot be
achieved because litigation costs remain.
Now suppose the injurer's choice of care is 2• If
compensatory damages are used, care, (12—s)/k, could be either
less than or greater than the first—best level, 11/k; however, no
litigation costs will be incurred. By setting d equal to s—(12-
11), the injurer can be induced to take the first-best level of
care (see (3.3)), again without litigation costs being incurred.
Thus, the first-best outcome can be achieved. Note that the
optimal adjustment, S-(l2-ll), is positive when the injurer's
care would be inadequate under compensatory damages——that is,
when (12-s)/k <l1/k--andnegative when the injurer would take
excessive care.
3.3 Care Unproductive (k <1)
In this case, the first-best level of care is zero. At
this level of care, both low—losers and high-losers suffer
harm.
If damages are compensatory, the injurer will take one of
three levels of care: zero care, resulting in suits by both
groups; ,resultingin suits only by the high-losers; or a2,
14resulting in no suits. Everything else equal, the higher the
injurer's litigation costs, the greater the level of care he will
take. Regardless of the level of care chosen by the injurer, the
first—best outcome will not be achieved with compensatory
damages. Either litigation costs will be incurred (if care is
zero), or excessive care will be taken (if care is 2) or both
(if care is i)•
However, if the adjustment to compensatory damages is
sufficiently negative--equal to s-12--neither group will sue (see
(3.3)). The injurer then will choose to take zero care. Hence,
the first—best outcome can be achieved by an appropriate downward
adjustment to compensatory damages.
3.4 Summary
The results of this section show that the optimal adjustment
to compensatory damages balances two considerations——the desire
to achieve the first—best level of care, and the desire to avoid
litigation costs. At one extreme, if care is very productive,
the injurer will take enough care to avoid suits, but, when
damages are compensatory, not enough to prevent harm. In this
case, it is desirable to adjust compensatory damages upward in
order to encourage the injurer to take more care. At the other
extreme, if care is unproductive, the injurer's choice of care
will result in litigation costs and/or excessive care. In this
case, it is desirable to adjust compensatory damages downward in
order to discourage suits and/or prevent excessive care. At both
extremes, the adjustment to compensatory damages leads to the
first—best outcome. Between the extremes, if care is moderately
15productive, the conflict between encouraging appropriate care and
reducing litigation costs cannot always be resolved as
successfully. In this case, even with the optimal adjustment to
compensatory damages——which may be positive or negative——some
litigation costs may be unavoidable.
164.Settlement versus Trial
Thus far, it has been assumed that settlement is not an
alternative to trial. It will be shown in this section that
allowing for the possibility of settlement lowers the optimal
adjustment to compensatory damages and may increase or decrease
social welfare. These points will be illustrated using the model
with two types of victims.
For simplicity, it is assumed that there are no costs
incurred by the parties in the settlement process, and that the
probability of settlement is exogenous.171 Let
b =probabilityof settlement, given suit.
The settlement amount is assumed to be greater than the
victim's gain from trial net of his litigation costs, but less
than the injurer's loss from trial, including his litigation
costs.J For low—losers, the net gain from trial is (l1-kc)+d-
s, while the injurer's loss from trial is (11—kc)+d+r. Thus, let
the settlement amount be
(4.1) (l1—kc)+d—s+a(r+s),
where a is a constant between zero and one. Similarly, for high—
losers, the settlement amount is assumed to be
(4.2) (12—kc)+d—s+a(r+s).
If a is close to zero, the settlement amount makes the
victim only slightly better off than he would be if he went to
trial, while it makes the injurer better of f than the trial
outcome by nearly the amount of the parties' joint litigation
17costs. Similarly, if a is close to one, the settlement amount
makes the victim much better off than the trial outcome, while it
makes the injurer only slightly better of f. The important point
to note is that, regardless of the value of a, both the victim
and the injurer are better of f if there is a settlement.
A victim will sue if the expected gain from suing (a
weighted average of the settlement amount and the net gain from
trial) exceeds the expected cost of litigation. Thus, low—losers
will sue if
b((11—kc)+d—s+a(r+s)] +(l—b)[(11—kc)+d]>(l—b)s.




Note that w is the increase in the victim's expected gain from
suing due to the possibility of settlement. Similarly, high—
losers will sue if c <2'where
(4.4) =(l2+d—s+w)/k.
Equations (4.3) and (4.4) represent a generalization of the
model of the previous section. When b =0,all cases are
litigated; then, since w =0,(4.3) and (4.4) are equivalent to
(3.2) and (3.3), respectively.
Introducing the possibility of settlement increases the
magnitudes of l and 2-—the care levels that forestall suits by
the low-losers and the high-losers, respectively. (To see this
formally, observe from (4.3) and (4.4) that ê1and2 are
18increasing in w.) This result has the following intuitive
explanation. Since a victim receives more from a settlement than
from a trial (net of his litigation costs), the possibility of
settlement makes suit more attractive. Hence, it is necessary
for the injurer to take more care in order to discourage victims
from suing.
As in the previous section, the injurer's choice of care and
the optimal adjustment to compensatory damages depend on the
productivity of care. However, it would not be particularly
instructive to reexamine all three of the cases discussed
earlier; in the remainder of this section it will be assumed that
care is moderately productive.-/
4.1 Care Moderately Productive
Since the possibility of settlement does not affect the sum
of the injurer's cost of care and the victims' losses, the first-
best level of care is unchanged. Thus, the first—best level of
care in this case is 11/k. Recall that, at this level of care,
the high—losers suffer harm but the low—losers do not.
When settlement was not possible, it was worthwhile for the
injurer to choose enough care either to just keep the low—losers
from suing, ,orto keep both groups from suing, 2• The
injurer's decision to forestall suits by one or both groups is
not affected by the possibility of settlement.2-Q! However, as
observed above, the possibility of settlement increases both
and 2• Since greater care will be taken by the injurer, the
optimal adjustment to compensatory damages does not need to be as
high. Specifically, if is chosen, it is clear from (4.3) that
19setting d equal to s-w induces the injurer to take the first-best
level of care. And if 2 is chosen, it is clear from (4.4) that
setting d equal to s-(12-11)-w accomplishes this. Note that,
whether the injurer chooses 2or2' the optimal adjustment to
compensatory damages falls by w——the increase in the victim's
gain from suing due to the possibility of settlement.2-1!
Comparing the sum of the injurer's costs of care, liability,
and litigation at and 2' it is easy to show that the injurer
will choose 2 over when
(4.5) (12—11)/k <(l—t)[12—11+(l—b) (r+s)].
Since b >0,(4.5) implies that the possibility of settlement
makes it more likely that the injurer will choose ê,. The
intuitive explanation of this result is straightforward: Since
the settlement amount is less than the injurer's loss from trial,
including his litigation costs, the injurer does not have as
strong an incentive to keep the high-losers from suing.
Thus, the possibility of settlement has two conflicting
effects on social welfare. It makes the choice of more
likely, which is undesirable because suits (by the high-losers)
will occur. But it lowers litigation costs if is chosen,
which is desirable. (The possibility of settlement does not
matter jf is chosen since neither group will sue.) In other
words, the possibility of settlement increases the number of
suits but lowers the expected cost of litigation per suit.
4.2 Summary
As in section 3, the optimal adjustment to compensatory
20damages balances the desire to achieve the first—best level of
care and the desire to avoid litigation costs. However, because
the possibility of settlement increases the victim's incentive to
sue (since the settlement outcome makes the victim better of f
than the trial outcome), the injurer has to take more care in
order to forestall suits. Consequently, the optimal adjustment
to compensatory damages does not need to be as high.
Moreover, the possibility of settlement makes it more likely
that the injurer will choose a level of care which does not
forestall suits by the high-losers (since the cost to the injurer
of being sued falls if some cases are settled). While high—
losers will sue more often, the possibility of settlement lowers
the expected cost of litigation per suit. Thus, social welfare
may increase or decrease.
215.Other Extensions
This section further extends the model with two types of
victims to allow for the use of a negligence rule and for damage
adjustments that vary with victims' losses. To simplify the
exposition, the possibility of settlement will be ignored.
5.1 Negligence
Thus far, it has been assumed that the applicable legal rule
is strict liability. An often-considered alternative to strict
liability is the rule of negligence. It will now be shown that
the use of a negligence rule generally increases social welfare
within the model because it can achieve the same level of care as
strict liability without encouraging as much litigation.
Under a negligence rule, the injurer is liable for the
victims' losses (and for any adjustment to compensatory damages)
only if the injurer does not take some minimum level of care.
This minimum--referred to as the standard of care--will be
assumed to equal the first—best level of care.22-!
It can be demonstrated that the rule of negligence with an
appropriate adjustment to compensatory damages can achieve the
first—best outcome regardless of the productivity of care.2-i"
Recall that the rule of strict liability also can achieve the
first—best outcome if care is either very productive or
unproductive (see subsections 3.1 and 3.3). Thus, in order to
show that negligence is able to do better than strict liability,
it will be assumed that care is moderately productive.
In this case, the first-best outcome can be achieved under
the negligence rule by setting d equal to 5;theexplanation is
22as follows. If care is moderately productive, the first-best
level of care is 11/k. The injurer clearly will not take care in
excess of this level of care since it is the standard of care.
Below 11/k, both low—losers and high—losers will sue; this is
because, with d =s,C1 =l1/k(and, as always, c2 >el).Thus,
for care below 11/k, the negligence rule and the strict liability
rule are equivalent. It was shown previously that, within this
range, strict liability led the injurer to take care equal to
11/k. Consequently, the negligence rule also will lead the
injurer to choose this level of care. And since the injurer will
have met the standard of care, no suits will occur. Hence, the
first-best outcome will result under the negligence rule.
Recall that, when care is moderately productive, strict
liability leads the injurer to choose care equal to or C2.If
c2 is chosen, the first—best outcome can be achieved, so strict
liability and negligence are equivalent. However, if l is
chosen, suits by the high-losers will occur, in which case
negligence is preferable to strict liability.
To summarize: Regardless of the productivity of care, the
negligence rule can achieve the first-best outcome. It is
therefore generally superior to strict liability. The advantage
of the negligence rule in the model is that it can lead the
injurer to take the desired level of care without encouraging
suits by the victims.2-4!
5.2 Variable DamacTe Adlustments
Thus far, it has been assumed that the adjustment to
compensatory damages is the same for low-losers and high—losers.
23It will now be shown in the context of the strict liability rule
that allowing for a variable adjustment can increase social
welfare. Moreover, the optimal adjustment is lower for the high—
losers than for the low—losers.
If care is either very productive or unproductive, it was
seen that the first-best outcome can be achieved by an adjustment
to compensatory damages that is the same for each group.
Therefore, it is not necessary to consider varying the adjustment
in these cases.
If care is moderately productive, it was seen that the
first—best outcome is not achievable when the injurer chooses ê.
Withvariable adjustments, however, the first—best outcome can
always be attained. To see how, let the adjustments for the low—
losers and the high—losers be d1 =sand d2 =S—(l2—ll),
respectively. It then follows from (3.2) and (3.3) that the
level of care that just keeps both groups from suing is 11/k--the
first—best level of care. If the injurer were to choose care
lower than 11/k, both groups would sue and it would be worthwhile
for the injurer to increase care to 11/k. Obviously, the injurer
will not take care greater than 11/k (neither group would be
suing). Therefore, the injurer will choose care level 11/k,
neither group will sue, and the first-best outcome will be
achieved.
Note that the optimal adjustment to compensatory damages is
lower for the high—losers (d2 <d1in the previous paragraph).
This occurs for the following reason. The high-losers have a
greater incentive to sue than the low-losers, everything else
24equal. Thus, in order to keep both groups from suing (and
thereby reduce litigation costs), the adjustment needs to be less
for them.
256.Concludin Remarks
This paper has discussed several welfare implications of
litigation costs in the theory of liability. Under strict
liability, it is not optimal to use compensatory damages since
this measure of damages generally will lead to a socially
inappropriate level of care and to excessive litigation costs.
The optimal adjustment to compensatory damages takes into account
the effects of liability both on the injurerts decision to take
care and on the victims' decisions to sue. Although these
general conclusions are not affected when the model is extended
to include settlements and variable damage adjustments, the
optimal adjustment to compensatory damages, as well as the
resulting level of social welfare, may be different. Also, the
rule of negligence is superior to the rule of strict liability;
this is because, within the model, there will not be any suits if
the injurer meets the standard of care (which is the first—best
level of care).
26Appendix
This appendix generalizes the framework used in the text to
allow for a continuum of victim types, a nonlinear loss function,
and for the probability of harm to be dependant on the injurer's
level of care. The notation will be the same as that used in the
main body of the paper, except for the following changes. Let
z =indexof victim type (0 ￿ z ￿ 1)
p(c,z) =probabilityof harmtovictims of typez
(P1 <0,P2 >0)
l(c,z) =lossof victims of type z (ii <0,12 >0)
f(z) =probabilitydensity of z
A victim will sue if l(c,z) +d>s.Thus, the victims who
sue can be identified by values of z greater than (c,d), where
(c,d) is defined implicitly by 1(c,) +d=s.Clearly, >0
and z2 <0.





Let c(d) represent the optimal level of care for the injurer,
given d. Assuming an interior optimum, it can be shown that
c'(d) >0.Intuitively, a higher d will induce more victims to
sue, which will lead the injurer to take more care.














Compensatory damages are optimal only if the sign of this
derivative is zero at d =0.However, there is no reason to
expect this to occur. As previously discussed, the first term is
positive since a higher level of liability will cause the injurer
to take more care. The second term is negative since higher care
lowers the expected losses of victims. The third term is
negative since higher care lowers the probability that victims
suffer harm, and therefore lowers expected litigation costs. And
the fourth term, also involving litigation costs, can be positive
or negative, depending on whether the increase in the number of
suits induced by a higher level of liability is greater or
smaller than the decrease in the number of suits resulting from
the injurer taking more care, and thereby lowering the harm
suffered by victims. Thus, whether it is optimal to adjust
compensatory damages upward or downward can be seen to depend on
the factors focused upon in the main body of the paper: how
productive care is in lowering the expected losses of victims and
how litigation costs are affected by the change in the level of
liability.Z/
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8409858, respectively). Polinsky's research also was supported
by the Hoover Institution while he was a National Fellow there in
1985-86. Helpful comments on an earlier draft of the paper were
provided by Lucian Bebchuk, Thomas Campbell, Robert Cooter, Paul
Joskow, Charles Kahn, Peter Menell, Jeffrey Perloff, David
Sappington, Steven Shavell, and Pablo Spiller.
21 See, for example, Brown (1973). Issues concerning
victim care, injurer and victim activity levels, and risk
allocation will not be treated in this paper.
21 Choosing an optimal adjustment to compensatory damages
obviously is equivalent to choosing an optimal level of
liability. The language of "adjusting compensatory damages" is
used in order to facilitate the comparison of the results in this
paper to the results in the conventional theory of liability
(without litigation costs), in which compensatory damages are the
benchmark.
V Although the principles to be discussed are not
completely illustrated by the examples, the generality of the
principles will become apparent.
Al To our knowledge no previous paper has addressed the
question of how the optimal level of liability is affected by the
29presence of litigation costs. Other papers that formally
consider the welfare implications of costly litigation in the
theory of liability focus on different issues. For example,
Green (1978) and Ordover (1981) have analyzed the optimal
standard of care under the rule of negligence. Shavell (1982),
and subsequently Menell (1983) and Kaplow (1985), have considered
the distinction between the private and the social incentive to
sue. There have also been several studies that analyze the
effects of litigation costs in models of liability, but which do
not focus on welfare issues. See, for example, Ordover (1978),
P'ng (1984), and Simon (1981) .Finally,Salop and White (1985)
have, in the context of private antitrust enforcement, informally
discussed several of the issues addressed in this paper.
/ In the Appendix, care is allowed to affect the
probability of harm occuring as well as the level of the loss.
j/ A linear loss function is assumed in order to
explicitly solve for the optimal adjustment to compensatory
damages. A general loss function is considered in the Appendix.
7J The assumption that s is less than 10 assures that there
will be suits if the injurer does not take any care. Otherwise,
the problem is uninteresting.
.J Note that, because the number of victims is
normalized to be unity, 10—kc represents the losses of all
victims.
V If k =1,the optimal level of care is either 0 or
10/k. For simplicity, this case is ignored. (Analogous cases
of equality are ignored in equation (3.1) below.)
30Q/ The assumption that a suit will not be brought when the
damage award just equals the cost of litigation does not affect
(Also, it is assumed that a positive
than 10/k since no harm is suffered at this level of care. Since
the analysis will show that the optimal d is in arange which
does not contradict the statements in the text, this complication
was ignored. (An analogous issue arises in section 3.)
2J This result is similar in spirit to Kaplow's (1985)
demonstration that prohibiting suits may increase social welfare
when litigation is costly.
)4J The Appendix allows for a continuum of victim types.
/ The consequences of allowing the adjustment to vary by
victim type are discussed in section 5.2 below.
/ Note that condition (3.6) does not depend on d. This
is because of the linearity of the victims' loss functions.
.12/ These and subsequent simplifications allow for an
explicit solution of the problem of finding the optimal
adjustment to compensatory damages, although they obviously
ignore game—theoretic considerations in the settlement process.
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the results of the paper.
loss must be incurred for a
j/Thispresumes that
participating in the harmful
these costs when the injurer
.121 Strictly speaking,
correct only for certain val
damages, d. For example, if
10/k, then the injurer would
suit to be brought.)
the injurer's gain from
activity is greater than the sum of
chooses care optimally.
the statements in this paragraph are
ues of the adjustment to compensatory
d is sufficiently high so that >
neverconsider choosing care greaterFor a similar approach to the analysis of settlement, see, for
example, Posner (1977, pp. 434—440) and Shavell (1982).
)J If there were uncertainty in the model concerning the
trial outcome, the statement in the text would be that the
settlement amount is between the victim's expected net award from
trial and the injurer's expected payment at trial.
)2J This case is the most interesting one because the
possibility of settlement affects both the optimal adjustment to
compensatory damages and the level of social welfare. In the
other two cases, only the optimal adjustment is affected.
.2.Q/ This is because the marginal benefit and the marginal
cost of care to the injurer are unchanged over the relevant
range. To see why the marginal benefit is unchanged, consider,
for example, care in the range in which both high—losers and low-
losers are suing. An additional dollar of care reduces the
injurer's liability at trial by k dollars for the fraction of
cases that go to trial. For the remaining fraction of cases that
are settled, the additional care also lowers the settlement
amount by k dollars (see (4.1) and (4.2)). Obviously, the
injurer's cost of taking care is unaffected by whether suits are
tried or settled.
Zi/ Although this conclusion has been demonstrated when
care is moderately productive, it holds in the other cases as
well.
J This is the usual assumption made in economic
analyses of the negligence rule. See, for example, Brown
(1973).
32ZJ That this statement is correct when care is moderately
productive will be shown in the text in the next paragraph.
When care is very productive, the first—best level of
care is 12/k. This level of care can be achieved under the
negligence rule without incurring litigation costs by setting d
equal to s. This is because, for care below 12/k, the injurer
would be liable under the negligence rule, making the negligence
rule equivalent to the strict liability rule; and it was seen in
section 3.1 that the strict liability rule with d equal to s
leads the injurer to choose 12/k.
When care is unproductive, the first—best level of care
is zero. In this case, the first—best outcome can be achieved
by the negligence rule with compensatory damages. An
adjustment to compensatory damages is unnecessary because,
when the injurer does not take any care, the standard of care
is met and no suits will result.
Z41 Although this advantage of the negligence rule is
well known——see, for example, Posner (1977, pp. 44l—443)——it
has not previously been examined within a formal model. If
the present model were extended to include uncertainty about
what the standard of care is or about whether the injurer has
met the standard, there would be some suits under the
negligence rule. Since these suits generally will be more
complicated than those under a strict liability rule, neither
rule would clearly dominate.
/ For example, if the derivative of the victims' expected
losses with respect to care approaches zero, then it can be shown
33that the optimal adjustment to compensatory damages becomes
arbitrarily small (i.e., approaches minus infinity).
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